ritory, and acquired for its nationals in China the privileges enjoyed by Westerners—at the time when it was seeking to be rid itself of the extraterritoriality granted to Westerners in its own domains. To protect its interests Japan was to be led to a more and more active part in the affairs of its huge neighbor.

RENEWAL OF EUROPEAN AGGRESSION IN CHINA

The defeat of China at the hands of Japan was the signal for a renewal of European aggression in China. The closing decades of the nineteenth century found European powers engaged in a scramble for such of the world as had not already been parceled out among Western peoples. They were being more and more industrialized, were increasing in wealth, and wished to control "backward" peoples, both as a matter of prestige and for markets, raw materials, and an outlet for surplus capital. They partitioned most of Africa and extended their possessions in Asia. They now proceeded to encroach upon a palpably impotent China in a manner which threatened the speedy dismemberment of that Empire. To recount all the intricacies and details of the negotiations and even of the resulting treaties and conventions would unduly prolong these pages. However, the main outlines of what was done must be sketched.

First of all, Japan was made to disgorge part of the territory ceded by China. The ink was scarcely dry on the treaty of Shimonoseki when France, Russia, and Germany lodged protests with Tokyo against its possession of the Liaotung Peninsula, alleging that it would be a menace to the capital of China, render illusory the independence of Korea, and make precarious the peace of the Far East. The powers were, of course, moved by no

regard for China: their interests in both Europe and the Far East were involved. Japan was in no position to defy the powers. Tokyo renounced its claim to the Liaotung Peninsula in return for an additional indemnity from China.

To pay the indemnity to Japan, China had to have recourse to foreign financiers. The privilege of advancing the first portion of the loan—made on the security of the maritime customs and with the possibility of demanding additional guarantees in the form of political or other concessions—was won by Russia, who was to have the assistance of French bankers. To offset the Franco-